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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

drawn and the acceptance of drafts in payment would afford the
bank considerable protection, but of course would not protect the
bank where it was the owner of the instrument forwarded for collection. The remedy seems to be the enactment in every state in
the Union of a statute giving the owner of the paper a preferred
claim upon the assets of the insolvent drawee bank. In the meantime banks should forward their items for collection with instrnctions that they must not be forwarded direct to drawee banks.
ROBERT W

REID.

RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES -

NEGLIGENCE -

DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES. -

Hickey,

owner of an automobile, met Bullock, and together they had two or three
drinks of intoxicating liquor. Thereafter, Hickey notifed the man in
charge of his car to allow Bullock to have it at any time. Hickey -wentto
his home, after which Bullock returned, took the car, met the plaintiffs
and invited them to ride to a restaurant with him. Bullock, over the protests of the plaintiffs, began speeding. After going four or five blocks, the
automobile struck an iron button in the street, careened into a pole and
seriously injured the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued both the driver and the
owner of the car. Held, that one given to drinking intoxicating liquor
must be regarded as an unsafe and a potentially incompetent and dangerous
driver, and that the owner of an automobile who knows of such habits and
intrusts his automobile to such a driver may be liable for resulting injuries
to third persons. Trotter v. Bullock, 148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825 (1928)
The instant case is decided chiefly on the authority of Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576 (1926) and Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash.
547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922) both of which rest upon the doctrine that a person
who loans his automobile to one who he knows uses intoxicants, is liable
for injuries resulting from the negligence of the driver while under the
influence of liquor.
Automobile are not be classed with such highly dangerous agencies as
dynamite or ferocious animals, and are not dangerous per se. Moore v.
Rode ie, 106 Wash. 548, 180 Pac. 879 (1919). In Mitchell -v. Churches, 119
Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922), it was held that while an automobile is not
a dangerous instrumentality, yet it may become such in charge of one
known to be incompetent by reason of addiction to intoxicants. In Dixon
v. Haynes, 146 Wash. 163, 262 Pac. 119 (1927) it was held that where a
drunken servant is driving a truck load of coal in the business of the master, the master is liable for a wrongful death which is the proximate result
of the servant driving an automobile even though the master had no
knowledge of his intoxication. The foregoing case involves the direct
liability of a master to a third person for the act of an intoxicated servant,
and rests squarely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior in the application of which knowledge of the master is not an essential factor. Cases
like the instant case, however, in which the permissive use of an automobile is granted to another, do not rest upon any master-and-servant or
principal-and-agent relationship; they rest rather upon the theory that
one must not knowingly subject third parties to persons or instrumentalities which under certain circumstances may become dangerous. In this
respect an analogy may be found in the general principle of the common
law sustaining the liability of a master to a servant injured by the negligence of a fellow servant, who the master knew or had reasonable grounds
to believe was incompetent.
K. G. S.
BILLS AND

NOTES---CHECKS-FRAUDULENT

INDORSEMENT-LIABIL'rIY

OF

PAYING BANK.-One C., while acting as bookeeper and cashier of the plaintiff corporation, without authority, indorsed checks payable to the corpora-
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tion by writing the name of the corporation over his own name. The
checks were cashed by C. at various stores, which in turn deposited them
with the defendant bank, which in turn received the proceeds of the checks
on their presentation to the banks on which they were drawn. The plaintiff sues the bank on the theory that by collecting the proceeds of the
checks it had been guilty of conversion, in that it acquired no title to
the checks by virtue of the unauthorized indorsements. Held, that the
plaintiff could recover. California Stucco Co. v. Marne National Bank,
148 Wash. 341, 268 Pac. 891 (1928).
The holding of the court in this instance is supported by ample authority. It is generally held that one cashing a check on a forged or unauthorized indorsement and collecting it from the drawee must account to the
payee. Grafton & Knight Manufacturing Co. v. Redelshetmer 28 Wash.
370, 68 Pac. 879 (1902) Allen v. Mendelsohn & Son, 207 Ala. 527, 93 S. W
416 (1922) ,Merchants Bank v. National CapitalPress, 288 Fed. 265 (1923)
Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort DearbornNational Bank, 311 Ill. 278,
142 N. E. 458 (1922) Buena Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank, 39 Cal. App. 710,
Farmerv. People's Bank, 100 Tenn. 187, 47 S. W 234
130 Pac. 12 (1919)
(1897). A few courts held an opposing doctrine. The case of Tibby Bros.
Glass Co. v. Farmer'sand Merchant'sBank, 220 Pa. 1, 69 Atl. 280, 15 L.R.A.
(N. S.) 519 (1908), is the leading case typical of the latter class.
In the instant case there was no apparent authority in the clerk to make
the indorsement, such as was present in the case of Hill Syrup Co. v.
American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 133 Wash. 501, 234 Pac. 11 (1925). In
that case it was the president of the corporation who wrongfully signed
the corporation name over his name in drawing on corporate funds. Consequently they held in the Hill Syrup case that the bank was not liable,
since the signature was apparently authorized and there was -no circumstance to put the defendant on inquiry
An interesting feature of the principal case is the theory on which recovery is had. The Washington court seems to hold that by bringing the action,
the plaintiff (the owner and payee) ratified the collection made by the
defendant bank from the drawee banks and consequently the defendant
bank hold the proceeds of the checks for the plaintiff. It cites United
States Portland Cement Co. v. United States National Bank of Denver, 61
Colo. 336, 157 Pac. 202 (1916), in support of this theory. Other courts
assign different reasons as the basis for the payee's right of recovery. The
generally accepted theory is that in the case of paper negotiable only by
indorsement, if the indorsement is forged or unauthorized, title does not
pass to the transferee; consequently the intermediate bank on collecting
the proceeds holds them for the payee, and they may be recovered either
by an action for conversion or by an action for money had and received,
Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort Dearborn National Bank, supra,
Standard Steam Specialty Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, 220 N. Y. 478, 116
N. E. 386 (1917) Knoxville Water Co. v. Bank, 123 Tenn. 364, 131 S. W
A. 0.
447 (1910)
PROCESs-ImmUNITY FRo--CoNsTaRANT.-The defendant, a non-resident of this state, in driving an automobile while visiting in Seattle collided with another automobile, killing a pedestrian, for whose death he was
sued in this action. Defendant was taken m custody of police but was
subsequently permitted to go on his own recognition upon agreeing to remain in Seattle until after the inquest. Three days after the accident
defendant accepted service of a verbal subpoena to attend the inquest the
next day. While at 'the inquest and before being discharged defendant
was served with summons in this action. The question was whether or not
defendant was entitled to immunity from service of civil process by reason
of the fact that he was then held in this state under constraint and was
attending the coroner's inquest as a witness. Held, the defendant was not
immune from the service of civil process on the ground that where one is
being held in tentative custody in a foreign jurisdiction the rule of immunity
from service of civil process does not apply. Husby v. Emmons. 148 Wash.
333, 268 Pac. 886 (1928).

